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Sanders 2
As the nonprofit sector increases in size, many organizations are choosing to
collaborate as a new approach to delivering goods and services to the public.
Collaboration occurs when “organizations work together to address problems through
joint effort, resources, and decision making and share ownership of the final product or
service” (Guo & Acar, 2005).
In my research, I ask the question: How do nonprofit administrators conceptualize
this kind of interorganizational collaboration? These conceptualizations are referred to as
tacit theories: the wisdom and knowledge of administrators that is implicitly known as a
result of experience. I compare these tacit theories to two well-known, competing
management theories, principle-agent theory and stewardship theory, to find whether
these tacit theories better align with either existing theory.
For my study, I chose a food distribution network which serves 12 counties
through over 300 partner organizations. I chose this network because of my interest in
food security and the network’s 30 years of experience in nonprofit collaboration. After
gathering qualitative data from 21 semi-structured interviews within this collaborative
nonprofit network, I used a grounded theory approach to explicate the tacit theories of
these administrators. Using this same qualitative data, I conducted two more data
analyses: searching for the presence of principal-agent theory factors in the first and the
presence of stewardship theory factors in the second.
From here, I compared my three data analyses and drew conclusions about how
nonprofit administrators conceptualize interorganizational collaboration, and whether
these concepts better align with principle-agent theory or stewardship theory. In this
study, I have found that these tacit theories take on concepts from both theories, with a
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tendency to move from principal-agency theory to stewardship theory over time as trust
builds.
Background
As the nonprofit sector continues to grow in size, organizations are choosing
collaboration as a new approach to delivering goods and services to the public (Proulx,
Hager, & Klein, 2014). In the past, nonprofit organizations may have partnered with
private companies for sponsorships (Feiock & Jang, 2009) or governmental agencies for
contracting different services (Suarez & Hwang, 2013); however, these partnerships are
occurring increasingly within the third sector between charitable organizations. Previous
researchers have defined collaborative relationships in different ways (Tsasis, 2009;
Snavely & Tracy, 2002); however, the definition I will refer to in this paper comes from
the findings of Guo and Acar (2005). They suggest that collaborative relationships occur
when organizations choose to “work together to address problems through joint effort,
resources, and decision making and share ownership of the final product or service.”
Existing research shows that organizations are choosing to collaborate for a
number of reasons. First, interorganizational collaboration allows organizations to share a
limited number of resources rather than compete for them. Jaskyte and Lee suggest that
organizations collaborate by sharing resources, information, technical assistance, and
work (2006). These are all examples of scarce resources: tangible goods to give clients,
information and technical assistance regarding best practices, and the laborious work that
can be involved in the day-to-day operations of a nonprofit. The idea, then, is that
nonprofits may reduce the unnecessary effort it takes to compete with each other for these
resources by combining forces to provide for the common good. As these organizations
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collaborate and share resources, they are also able to share ideas, meaning new
opportunities for innovation. Jaskyte and Lee identify three ways in which these
collaborative relationships provide opportunities to innovate: in product, process, and in
administration (2006). Product innovation refers to the introduction of new goods or
services. Process innovation refers to the creation of new ways of delivering goods and
services. Lastly, administrative innovation involves management processes (i.e. filing,
databases, etc.). Overall, these three forms of innovation mean new solutions to the social
problems addressed by each organization. However, by innovating in a collaborative
relationship, more minds are able to approach the same problem, and two minds are
better than one. These relationships can be binary, or they can exist in the form of a
collaborative network, consisting of more than two organizations.
When evaluating these collaborative networks, one way we are able to assess
them is their approach to management. This understanding has been heavily influenced
by research conducted in business management theory and contract theory (Bowie &
Freeman, 2003, p.10). However, these two fields differ from collaboration within the
third sector because of the assumption that nonprofit organizations operate with the desire
to maximize the public good, while businesses strive for profit maximization. For this
reason, there exists a need for more research regarding management theory within
collaborative nonprofit networks to determine how it may be distinct from other sector or
cross-sectoral relationships. Two management theories that have been applied to all three
sectors (government, business, and nonprofit) and cross-sector relationships are principalagent theory and stewardship theory. These two theories are commonly paired together
because stewardship theory was created as a response principal-agent theory; therefore,
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they demonstrate an interesting contrast in management theories (Van Puyvelde, Caers,
Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012;Van Slyke, 2006).
Principal-agent Theory
Principal-agent theory was developed in response to the rise of the corporation.
As the demand for capital grew with the size of organizations, chief administrators were
forced to delegate control. These chief administrators acted as principals, and their
delegates became their agents. Assuming these agents are rational, self-interested
individuals, principals must implement external controls to align the agents’ goals with
their own. Therefore, a successful principal-agent relationship becomes mutually
beneficial with the agent benefiting from the incentives and the principal benefiting from
the agent aligning with their mission and goals (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).
Principle-agent theory assumes that there is goal incongruence and information
asymmetry between principals and agents. First, individuals are assumed to act in selfinterest, pursuing their own goals. For this reason, principals must make it advantageous
to the agent’s self-interest to partner with the agent. Next, agencies operate under a
bounded rationality; both principal and agent have a limited knowledge of the other’s
behavior and actions. Information asymmetry also means that agents may be more
knowledgeable than the principle in a certain area and leverage this against the principal
as a bargaining chip (Eisenhardt, 1989). Both of these assumptions are addressed through
the use of incentives. By offering incentives to agents that they would not be able to
receive on their own, the agents are more likely to align their goals with those of the
principal. Furthermore, because the agent is receiving something in return for their
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compliance, agents are more likely to not withhold information regarding their behavior
and activities and to engage in behaviors that meet the principal agency’s goals.
Additionally, principal-agent theory assumes an initial disposition to distrust and
a control-oriented management philosophy (Van Slyke, 2006). Considering that
principals must modify agents’ behavior through the use of incentives, it is logical that
these principals would take a control-oriented management philosophy. At the same time,
the unpredictability of self-interested agents necessitates an initial disposition to distrust
on the part of the principal in an effort to minimize risk (Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997).
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory, developed as an alternative management theory to principleagent theory, focuses on the importance of relationships rather than measuring these
interorganizational contracts in economic terms. Where principal-agent theory employs
sanctions and incentives to control for a disposition to distrust and information
asymmetry, stewardship theory assumes a trusting disposition and shared goals on the
part of each organization. This involves a more positive view of human nature,
considering the chance of motivational altruism on the part of the steward (Dicke, 2002).
Stewardship theory suggests that stewards act in the public interest because they believe
this holds more utility than acting in self-interest. Furthermore, by working towards
organizational objectives, stewards trust that their personal needs will be met (Davis,
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 2007). For example, a principal agency may witness its
steward agency acting in good faith towards its clients; as a result, the principal agency
will be more willing to trust the steward to act according to organizational goals and will
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allow the steward more administrative discretion. Other intrinsic rewards that may
motivate the steward agency include increased trust, reputation, reciprocity,
responsibility, job satisfaction, stability, and mission alignment (Van Slyke, 2006).
In comparison to principal-agent theory, stewardship theory also involves a
greater investment on the part of the principal. Not only is there a high initial risk when
giving a steward this kind of trust, but it also takes both time and monetary investments
to involve stewards in organizational processes and informational exchanges. However,
because stewardship theory values shared informational exchange and few boundaries,
these costs are deemed necessary in order to uphold transparency in the principal-steward
relationship. Another stark difference in comparison to principal-agent theory is
stewardship theory’s likelihood to be present in third sector relationships (Bundt, 2000).
Because these organizations are not simply concerned with a bottom line and
productivity, stewardship theory better acknowledges the importance of shared goals in a
value-laden sector.
A Comparison
Both principal-agent theory and stewardship theory are two legitimate
management theories that can teach us a lot about organizational collaboration, but these
theories do not always translate directly into practice. Organizational relationships are
unpredictable and dynamic; practitioners must adjust these theories to best suit their
collaborations. The frameworks for management entrenched in administrators’ minds are
known as tacit knowledge. Over time, these administrators begin to act according to their
own tacit theories of management. To describe tacit knowledge, Rod Watson uses the
example of standing in front of a house. You are only able to see the front of the house,
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but you know that there are also two other sides and a back to the house. No one has to
tell you; you simply know (Watson, 2006). In the same way, there are aspects of
management that nonprofit administrators just know; however, these many not always be
reflected in traditional management theories. For this reason, it is important to investigate
these tacit theories in order to learn more about management in practice. These tacit
theories have been studied to provide insight into a number of other social service
organizations (Horne, 2012; St. Germain & Quinn, 2006); in my research, I will be
interpreting the tacit theories of administrators within a collaborative food delivery
network.
In my research, I ask the question: How do nonprofit administrators conceptualize
interorganizational collaboration? Are these concepts more in line with principal-agent
theory or stewardship theory or neither? I chose principal-agent and stewardship theory
as my two comparative theories because after learning briefly about principal-agent
theory and stewardship theory, I was curious if either of these theories actually aligned
with the ways in which administrators in collaborative nonprofit networks operate.
Principal-agent theory and stewardship theory are nearly always coupled as opposing
theories, so I decided these two theories would represent opposite ends of the
management style spectrum and provide interesting comparisons to the tacit theories of
the administrators.
The nonprofit administrators I interviewed in my research are members of a large
food delivery network covering over twenty counties and based in a mid-sized city in the
southeastern United States. They are a member of the Feeding America network as well.
Last year alone, they distributed 12.7 million pounds of food, including 2.5 million
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pounds of produce. I chose this specific network because of my interest in food security
and the rich amount of practitioner wisdom present here; this particular network has been
serving the area for over thirty years and is a noticeable force in the communities they
serve. The network consists of one lead organization and over 300 partner organizations.
Interactions between the partners and lead organization come in many forms. The
lead organization provides discounted food, either by delivery or pick up, but they also
provide guidance and training to their partners as well. Each partner organization is
assigned a contact person who they may contact at any time with inquiries, and the
partner organizations are all invited to informational classes and luncheons at the lead
organization’s facility. These classes cover everything from new technologies to new
opportunities to providing opportunities for partner agencies to discuss best practices and
get to know one another. Additionally, the lead organization keeps partner organizations
informed by distributing monthly newsletters.
Many organizations have been partners in this network for over ten years, while
others have joined the network recently. The communities served by each of these
organizations is also very different; some serve homeless populations in the heart of the
city, while others assist the working poor in impoverished, rural communities. Some are
brick-and-mortar facilities, while others are mobile pantries. At the same time, within the
last year, the lead organization has implemented new goals to improve the health of its
clients as well as meet basic needs; this means the incorporation of fresher foods, and in
turn, new regulations for the network’s partner organizations. This presents a unique
learning opportunity to examine a variety of partner organizations, both new and old,
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working with different populations, while all of them are adjusting to these new
procedures and working with the same lead organization.
I interviewed 21 administrators from the network. After conducting interviews
with these administrators, I performed three separate data analyses. First, I was able to
draw conclusions about the administrators’ tacit theories regarding management in a
collaborative network using a grounded theory approach. Next, I analyzed the same data
set using codes drawn from principal-agent theory literature, and then I performed a third
analysis using codes from stewardship theory literature. With these three different
analyses, I was able to draw conclusions about the management theories utilized by this
collaborative network.
Methods
An 8 question semi-structured interview survey was administered to a purposive
sampling of the collaborative network. The survey of this network consisted of an
administrator from the lead organization and administrators from 20 partner
organizations. The interviewees covered 12 counties: 6 Georgia counties (Gordon,
Walker, Gilmer, Fannon, Whitfield, and Catoosa) and 6 Tennessee counties (Hamilton,
Bradley, Rhea, McMinn, Marion, and Meigs). 4 agencies were located within Bradley
County, while 5 agencies (including the principal agency) were located within Hamilton
County.
In all, 21 interviews were used in this analysis. On average, each interview took
approximately 34 minutes. 3 interviews took place face to face, while 18 interviews took
place over the phone. Out of the over 300 partner organizations, 70 partner organizations
were contacted, and 20 organizations responded with a willingness to participate. These
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organizations were chosen because of their representation on the lead organization’s
website. A purposive strategy was chosen in order to gather insight from the most
involved, representative partner organizations within the network. The interviews were
tape-recorded and then transcribed. After the eighteenth interview, it was apparent that I
had reached my point of saturation because I was not receiving any new meaningful
responses; they began to sound the same.
The 8 question semi-structured interview survey was created with the principles
of principal-agent theory and stewardship theory in mind. Some general questions were
asked to encourage administrators to speak freely regarding their own tacit theories
concerning interorganizational collaboration: “Can you explain a specific time when your
arrangement with the (lead or partner) was successful? Unsuccessful?” At the same time,
language was used to probe for the presence of principal-agent relationships: “Explain the
measures taken by (lead or partner) to monitor your organization.” Lastly, some questions
probed for the presence of principal-steward relationships: “What, if anything, has
strengthened (or weakened) your connection with the (lead or partner organization)?
Probe: trust, relationships, reputation, monitoring/oversight.” This variation in questions
provided sufficient conversation to examine each interorganizational relationship under
the lenses of principal-agency theory, stewardship theory, and the personal tacit theories
of the administrators themselves. To view the entire interview schedule, see Appendix.
In order to maintain an open mind in coding to produce a grounded theory, three
waves of analysis were conducted. After transcribing all interviews, I began an open
coding process to mark specific relational or transactional characteristics found in each
interview; if an administrator expressed a certain attitude or belief regarding their
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relationships within the network, it was coded as relevant. Next, through a process of
axial coding, these instances were first identified as either “beneficial” or “unbeneficial”;
from there, these codes were grouped into trends that served as the basis for my grounded
theory.
After the data was sufficiently analyzed through the lens of this grounded theory,
the interviews were coded a second time to search for the presence of principal-agent
relationships. These codes were identified in the existing body of research regarding
principal-agent theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Van
Slyke, 2006). Lastly, the data was coded a third time using codes related to stewardship
theory (Bundt, 2000; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 2007; Dicke, 2002; Van Slyke,
2006 ).
Analysis
Tacit theories of administrators
A grounded theory approach was taken to come to the following conclusions.
Rather than using data to prove an existing theory, the grounded theory approach begins
with formulating a question and gathering relevant qualitative research in order to build
an original theory. During data analysis, elements and ideas are first pulled from the data;
then, these ideas are grouped into codes, which are then grouped into categories. Finally,
these categories are used to arrive at conclusions that form the basis of the new theory.
I chose to take a grounded theory approach in order to learn from the tacit theories
of the administrators I interviewed. Rather than taking a deductive approach and using
existing theory, I wanted to observe whether the practicing theories of these
administrators were in line with academic understandings of network collaboration. In
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order to do this, it was important for me to first build a grounded theory that explicated
the tacit theories of the administrators I was interviewing. From here, I was able to
compare this grounded theory to two existing theories (agency theory and stewardship
theory) that attempt to explain these collaborative arrangements.
The grounded theory method is rooted in the symbolic interactionist school of
thought. Symbolic interactionism rests on three main premises (Locke, p. 22). First,
“people interpret the meaning of objects in the world and then act upon those
interpretations.” The term “object” can refer to a multitude of things such as language,
gestures, policies, or even physical objects within an organization. In the case of this
study, the objects are food delivery transactions between organizations, the mission
statements of the organizations, formal oversight arrangements between principal and
partner organizations, training courses provided by the principal organization for its
partners, the designation of contacts between agencies, and the distribution of monthly
newsletters. Second, “meaning arises from social interaction—communication between
and among individuals—and not from the object.” It is not the object itself that creates
meaning, but the social interaction surrounding the objects. For example, it is not the
training courses themselves which convey meaning; it is the way these training courses
are perceived by the administrators involved. Are they seen as helpful? Do administrators
feel pressured to attend, or is this an enjoyable experience for those involved? Lastly,
“meaning is handled in and modified through an ongoing interpretive process.” Because
meaning is derived from social interactions, these meanings are ever-changing depending
on circumstances such as organizational or personnel changes. Therefore, by viewing an
organization through the interpretation of its employees, grounded theory provides a
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more accurate understanding of an organization than one could gain by merely peering in
from the outside. It facilitates a way to look past the face value of organizational
structures and interpret the meanings of these structures through administrative
interpretations.
In order to do this, it is important for the researcher to enter into the research
process with as few assumptions as possible. In the case of this study, I accomplished this
by using minimal research to gain a basic understanding of the elements present in
collaborative nonprofit relationships. From here, I began the process of coding explained
previously in my methods. Once I had produced the codes of “beneficial” and
“unbeneficial” instances, I further organized these codes in order to form trends. These
trends form the basis of my theory and can be found below in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1

Trends from Interviews

Professionalism

Informal Relationships

Adaptability

Transparency

Cooperation

Availability

Honesty

Friendship

Flexibility

Trust

History

Proactivity

Expertise

Support

Ability to meet needs

The three trends, professionalism, informal relationships, and adaptability, were
the three most mentioned characteristics of healthy, mutually beneficial collaborative
relationships. At the same time, it was the absence of these factors that administrators felt
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produced unbeneficial arrangements. The attitudes of administrators towards the network
were overwhelmingly positive, allowing me to draw conclusions regarding the kinds of
relationships these administrators strive for.
Professionalism.
Professionalism was marked by the presence of transparency, honesty, trust, and
expertise on the part of both the lead and partner organizations. Transparent, honest
communication was found to be crucial in creating trust between administrators. To
facilitate this, barriers were removed in both a physical and relational sense. Partner
organizations are encouraged to tour the lead organization’s facility. At the same time,
monthly newsletters and a humble approach to problem solving prevented information
asymmetry within the network, allowing administrators to feel as though they were “on
the same page.” These feelings of transparency and honesty necessarily led to a mutual
trust between the lead organization and its partners. Because there are honest, open lines
of communication, partner organizations are given greater autonomy in their
programming. Administrators at the partner organizations reported feeling trusted and
respected for their choices in programming.
Previous research confirms these findings. In a similar study surveying a network
of 36 nonprofit children’s behavioral health organizations, researchers found that
trustworthiness and coordination were necessarily intertwined. As administrators begin to
build trust, they are more likely to coordinate administrative functions between agencies
(Bunger, 2012). While it is difficult to determine which comes first, it appears that there
must be some basic form of trust between organizations before partnering. However, as
time progresses, trust is proven through the organizations’ track records. Interestingly
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enough, many partners originate as competitors. According to a study from 2007,
knowing thy enemy most often leads to partnering with them (Trapido). Because
competitors necessarily have to maintain a working knowledge of each other’s operations
in order to compete, competing organizations are able to build this knowledge-based trust
more quickly than organizations who are unfamiliar with one another.
The scarcity of resources is commonly what makes competing organizations
coordinate initially; these resources may include administrative expertise, fundraising and
financial capabilities, connections to and understanding of target audiences, and
experience, knowledge, and information that is needed but not possessed by other
partners (Ostrower, 2003). Rather than competing with roughly 300 other agencies to
feed the same service area, the organizations interviewed during this study chose to
collaborate by joining a broader network. In this way, resources such as expertise, food,
best practices, technology, and workspace are shared among the network partners rather
than hoarded to a few successful organizations.
The partner organizations and lead organization look to each other for different
kinds of resources. Partner agencies are quick to consult the lead organization for
feedback because of their reputation as an invaluable resource of expertise. Both the
partner organizations and lead organization are valued by each other for their expertise in
particular regards. Partner organizations were described as having “the hard job.” They
are acknowledged as having the best understanding of the network’s work at its most
basic level; they hold an invaluable understanding of the needs of the network’s clients.
At the same time, the lead organization’s expertise regarding systematic processes and
organizational goals is equally invaluable. The provision of training, classes, and new
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perspectives help partner organizations to achieve their individual organizational goals.
One administrator had this to say about the sharing of expertise:
I will say I think particularly with (the lead organization), because they
cover such a large area, their perspective and their ability to require
resources is something that's invaluable to us, a smaller partner that
doesn't have the network or the pull that they do. Or even their
perspective. So it's been really good for us to count on them as a bigger
entity that has a broader network and better perspective to do some more
of the heavy lifting for us in situations where we as a smaller, more
localized organization couldn't do. They help us to see needs beyond
what's in our own backyard. Yeah, I know we have needs right here, but
what I wasn't aware of are the needs in the rural areas.
Partner organizations are able to focus on the intricate details of the area they
serve; they become well-acquainted with the people they serve, their unique
needs, and the capacity of their organization to meet those needs. However,
without the assistance of a larger organization, these partner organizations lack
the ability to see or do anything at the macro level. The lead organization is able
to vision cast for its partners; it coordinates partner organizations to accomplish
the “heavy lifting.” Rather than ending hunger at the city or county level, a wellcoordinated network is able to impact a much larger service area. This is an
important benefit of a network relationship. A network sharing information from
the micro and macro levels can more efficiently serve an area than one single
organization trying to play both roles.
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Beyond vision casting, the lead organization provides partner organization
administrators with tools and connections they would not otherwise have access
to. In the words of one administrator, “They’re that bridge between us and the
market.” Several administrators reported being connected to corporate
partnerships through the network, allowing organizations to provide their clients
with more food than they could afford otherwise. The lead organization is also
essential in providing guidance specific to the food delivery network. While
administrators of smaller partner agencies are full of a desire to eradicate hunger
in their area, many are unequipped to do this in an efficient and effective manner.
In this case, the lead organization provides its partners with food service training
and certification and even cooking education.
The lead organization holds all of its partners to certain guidelines:
workers must be certified through the food handling course offered at the lead
organization’s facility, USDA safety guidelines must be followed, and certain
amounts of food and produce must be moved each month. However, in the words
of one administrator, “They have been an influence that helps. They don't
deteriorate anything around here; they only uplift. Their guidelines are very
good.” While there are obvious reporting measures that must be taken to ensure
food safety, these interviews demonstrated a very informal governance of these
guidelines. Administrators reported that inspections were given only as needed
and were very friendly. Many administrators even mentioned the inspectors
prefacing these inspections with, “We know you all are doing the right thing, but
we’re just going to take a look around.” According to a study by Gulati and
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Nickerson, these informal governance measures are another indicator of trust.
They found that “high levels of pre-existing interorganizational trust increased the
probability that a less formal, and thus less costly, mode of governance was
chosen over a more formal one” (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Furthermore, these
more informal governance structures were found to enhance exchange
performance between the organizations.
Even as these partners are held to higher standards, they are also given the
means to reach these goals. One administrator recounted how the lead
organization helped her in learning how to reach these standards: “There are times
that I can call and ask questions like, ‘How do you make a can of green beans
healthy?’ Yes, it's great out of the garden, but I don't have that avenue. They will
give me information and stuff like that; they're a great resource.” While much of
this learning takes place through individual contact, the lead organization also
offers classes and monthly luncheons to learn more about specific practices.
Lack of Professionalism.
While the existence of expertise and trust are essential to the health of a network
collaboration, the absence of these are just as impactful on a collaborative relationship. A
few administrators shared instances in which the lack of trust caused the deterioration of
a working partnership with organizations outside of the network:
We were treated as if we were trying to steal things from them. In fact, we
were buying several thousand dollars from them each month, but such a
lack of trust that they were saying we needed to come at a separate time to
get our stuff, make sure we go out through the front, things like that. They
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wanted to include another church in pickups because we could not pick up
six days a week, so they were just going to have another church pick it up.
They had altered the times. That was fine if they had divided the things
equitably, but we figured out they were leaving us the chump stuff. Stuff
we would throw away, but they were giving better stuff to the other
agency. That became a major issue to us at that point.
This particular administrator was forced to cut ties with this corporate partner and
explore other resources. In this instance, the use of stricter governance measures
is apparent. As the other organization became more distrusting, they enacted
stricter measures on this partner organization (picking up at specific times, only
entering through the front door, etc.) Also, these organizations became less likely
to share useful resources. The partner agency reported receiving “the chump
stuff”, rather than food and produce they were able to use.
In another instance, the lead organization had to end its partnership with
one of its partners because they were selling donated food. The most interesting
piece of this scenario was that they became aware of this violation from other
organizations within the network. This proves the importance of trustworthiness
to the network’s administrators. Beyond maintaining a trustworthy and
professional relationship within their own partnerships, these administrators also
see a moral duty to report any acts of mistrust they observe within the network. In
this way, it is clear that these partner organizations are not acting in a professional
manner purely for individual gain, but for the health of the entire network.
Informal relationships.

Sanders 21
Informal relationships were characterized by the presence of cooperation,
friendship, history, and support on the part of both lead and partner organizations. This
“people-centered” approach was apparent both within the relationships between
organizations and towards their clients. Between the organizations themselves,
cooperation and friendship were crucial. The words coordination and cooperation are
often used interchangeably, but in this case, they are different. Coordination implies
deliberate adjustment and collective goals, while cooperation is the working together of
organizations “as they are”, allowing organizations to maintain autonomy in the way they
manage and run their programs (Alter & Hage, p. 81). Coordination is a specific kind of
cooperation; it implies working together, but with some necessary adjustments. While
this study is primarily focused on the ways these organizations choose to coordinate with
one another, there were also some key examples of cooperation between these
organizations. These instances were driven by the informal relationships formed between
administrators.
Many administrators noted that these relationships extended beyond business and
cultivated real friendships between the staff. These friendships made it easier for
administrators to communicate honestly and understand the specific needs of each
organization. These friendships fostered what administrators referred to as “history.”
History referred to both the continuity of staff and the presence of a lasting partnership
between the organizations themselves. History allows collaborative partners to move past
the initial period of understanding the other organization to focus on the shared goals held
by both partners. One partner administrator spoke honestly of staff changes at the
principal organization:
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Oh yeah. I'm not going to lie. Change is difficult. So anytime I knew or
had a relationship with someone who retired and someone new came in, I
gave them the side eye for a while, but I got over it.
While expertise is a large part of partner compatibility, at the heart of
collaboration, it is simply person-to-person connections. It takes time for these kinds of
connections to form, which is why history plays such a key role in partner agencies’
ability to cooperate. Over time, however, relationships in this particular network seem to
thrive. An administrator at the lead organization proudly shared that each year awards are
given to partner administrators such as "Most likely to bend the rules to feed hungry
people" or, “World’s best hugger.”
While previous research regarding informal relationships and interorganizational
collaboration in the third sector is lacking, there is previous research regarding this topic
in the business sector. In line with the opinions of the administrators I interviewed,
existing research shows that these interpersonal relationships are what supplement the
original, formal relationships. Partnerships begin as purely professional, transactional
relationships. As I’ve mentioned previously, they are forged by a knowledge-based trust
of the other organization. From here, however, it is the informal, interpersonal
relationships that are formed between administrators that sustain these partnerships.
Essentially, these informal relationships are driven by administrators’ purpose, values,
and expected consequences (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). In the case of my research, the
administrators’ purpose and values seemed to be heavily intertwined. The network’s
partners all shared coming together under a common purpose: ending hunger in their
prospective service area. 75% of the partner organizations interviewed are religiously
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affiliated. When asked whether there was any discrepancy between those affiliated and
those who were not, one administrator shared that they all seemed to operate under a
similar set of morals. Furthermore, when asked what strengthened the relationship
between organizations, the most common response was the network’s shared client focus.
As another administrator stated, “One thing that's really neat with the two of us is that we
really like our clients a lot. We'd rather hang out with them than anybody else. There is
that deep fondness for the people that we serve.”
Lastly, expected consequences become more predictable over time as history
builds between partner organizations. Findings show that social ties develop more
quickly between organizations that have a history of working together (Galaskiewicz &
Shatin, 1981). While partnerships begin with small, formal deals, over time, these
organizations are more willing to engage in higher risk dealings (Ring & Van de Ven,
1994). This is why personal history is so important to administrators. As partnerships
progress, partner organizations feel comfortable stepping out to accomplish new, possibly
risky, projects.
Lack of informal relationships.
The lack of informal relationships can better be categorized as a means-based
approach. Rather than focusing on the personnel involved, organizations may value
outcomes and end results more than the people involved along the way. In place of trust
and cooperation, competition is the most defining characteristic of this approach.
Competition can be defined as an occurrence when multiple organizations rely on the
same resources to produce similar services (Hunt, 2007). One partner administrator
shared a competitive scenario it experienced with its lead organization:
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They (the lead organization) moved here and the only challenge I would
say happened when they moved here is that they wanted partner agencies
to talk to the community and share why it would benefit them, but we kind
of remained neutral in the aspect that we knew we are the largest food
pantry in (our area). And so we knew that when the satellite came, it was
going to be a blessing and a curse. They were going to come and compete
for our donated food, for our food dollars in the community, and also for
our volunteers.
In this instance, the lead organization was moving into town to assist the partner
organization. However, the resources available (existing donors, food drive
partners, and customers) did not change; therefore, both organizations were left to
compete for them. The partner administrator went on to explain that it was not
until an administrator from the lead organization approached her that they were
able to have a conversation about cooperation in this service area. The
administrator at the lead organization requested a list of existing donors, food
drive partners, and customers so that they would be able to prevent overlap as
much as possible. Here the use of communication and interpersonal relationships
in fostering cooperation is obvious. If the lead organization had continued to act
without contacting the partner organization, a competitive environment would
have most likely formed. However, it was in the best interest of both the lead and
partner organizations to cooperate; the lead organization, being larger, had the
ability to do more heavy lifting, while the partner organization carried expertise of
the community that helped the lead organization engage the community. In this
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way, the interpersonal relationships formed helped to build the resources of both
organizations.
Adaptability.
Adaptability was marked by the presence of availability, flexibility, proactivity,
and willingness to meet needs on the part of both lead and partner organizations. Just as it
is important for partner organizations to know the needs of their communities well, it is
equally important for the lead organization to be flexible and willing to bend with the
unique needs of their partner organizations. The organizations within this particular
network are so different, ranging from a metropolitan soup kitchen feeding three meals a
day to a rural food pantry serving food, clothing, and goods to a county with 25% of its
population living at or below the poverty line. Because these organizations look very
different, they require specific solutions to their unique situations. In this way,
adaptability requires these organizations to be open to learning from these unique
situations. Previous research has noted the importance of this willingness to learn and
adapt (Strichman, Bickell, & Marshood, 2008). Learning organizations are characterized
by “commitment to inquiry, exhibiting fluid information exchange across organizational
boundaries (external and internal), possessing knowledge management systems that
facilitate collective learning, and demonstrating strategic and tactical decision-making
based upon what is being learned” (Bickel, Millett, & Nelson, 2002, p. 1). This
collaborative network is a prime example of inquiry making, information exchange,
collective learning, and strategic decision making. Often times, the only thing these
agencies have in common are their tie to the lead organization and the network’s goals.
However, these differences can be a source of growth and innovation for the network;
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therefore, administrators’ shared commitment to adapting and learning become another
uniting factor. One administrator explained:
I think more minds are able to meet now and be more innovative then they
may have been in the past. Say, in one agency you have a newcomer in a
leadership role and they were thinking outside the box and really different
things and they were met with someone from the partner agency who just
wanted to keep things the same and do things the way we always have.
When that happens, there isn't going to be a good working relationship or
new cool things to do. Fortunately, we have paired well with the (lead
agency) and that's sort of what has happened with us.
More people mean more ideas. These “new cool things to do” are what drive a network to
think about innovative solutions to the same problems they continuously face.
Furthermore, it is the lead organization’s job to collaborate in a way that not only
helps the network fulfill its purpose, but also makes sure that each partner organization is
able to reach its full potential. Lead organizations should be so in tune with the operations
of their partners that they are able to make recommendations that increase the reach and
effectiveness of the network as a whole. The overwhelming majority of administrators
shared that they felt the lead organization went “above and beyond” and “out of their
way” to facilitate the unique needs of the individual partner organizations. Notifying
administrators about specific products, delivering food in unique packaging, answering
phones after hours, and staying late to help partner organizations load their trucks are all
examples given to demonstrate this kind of adaptability on the principal organization’s
part. As mentioned previously, Jaskyte and Lee (2006) organize innovation into three
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categories: innovation of product, innovation of process, and innovation of
administration. Product innovation refers to the introduction of new goods or services.
Process innovation refers to the creation of new ways of delivering goods and services.
Lastly, administrative innovation involves specifically management processes. While this
study did not present any obvious cases of administrative innovation, product and process
innovation have been a key part of growing this delivery network.
Due to the eagerness of the network’s partner organizations to try new things and
innovate, the network was able to pilot three different programs: a milk program, a
produce program, and a food pantry for the elderly. The milk program and produce
program are both examples of product innovation; the network did not previously offer
these products. The food pantry for the elderly, on the other hand, is an example of
process innovation; the network did not have any programs specifically targeting this
population. When asked what made these agencies a good fit for piloting these programs,
an administrator at the lead organization believed it was the willingness to do things
differently:
They came to the table with passion, which I think is important. They
knew there was a need. And they came with a willingness to try anything.
So we piloted some different things for them...and they've just done a
fantastic job.
Therefore, according to the experiences of administrators, this ability to innovate
is influenced by the mere willingness to do so. Flexibility and a desire to learn
through experience were shown to facilitate innovation among partners in this
network.
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Lack of Adaptability.
On the other hand, an inability to learn from experience and strict adherence to
established rules inhibit partner organizations from adapting and innovating together.
One administrator shared a frustrating situation that exhibits this kind of rigidness:
They would deliver to us, but they don't fill the trucks the way we will
because they have more regulations they have to follow, so it's not cost
effective for them to bring us a half a truck load of food and us pay them
for it. They would charge us to deliver it. It would cost us more to have
them deliver food to us because we would go there more often than if we
just delivered the food ourselves. We double stack everything, but they
won't do that.
In this example, there is an opportunity for process innovation; perhaps there is a
solution that would allow the partner organization to receive the same amount of
food they’re currently ordering but also having it delivered (i.e. a bigger truck,
changing guidelines, etc.). However, in order to do this, both organizations would
have to have the capacity and ability to innovate in these ways.
Another administrator shared frustrations with having to attend irrelevant
meetings:
I don't mean to sound arrogant but those are much smaller organizations
and they have a different kind of challenge then we have. Most agencies
and churches and groups have a food voucher model where they'll buy x
number of vouchers a month. We have no limit that way.
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Unlike the previous example that remains to be solved, the network has already begun to
innovate a new approach to holding informational meetings for partner organizations.
This is another example of process innovation; in order to make these meeting relevant
and effective in teaching partner organizations, the lead organization must be able to
communicate in a way and share ideas that further the purpose of each organization's
specific meeting. Another administrator who also feels the burden of being different,
shared that the lead organization’s administrators are already planning to host different
informational meetings for these organizations that “do things a little differently.” As this
process progresses, it will require a level of adaptability and openness to new approaches.
Even if the first attempt at solving this issue fails, the administrators involved must
remain committed to finding a solution.
Principal-agent Theory
Within this particular collaborative network, there were very few instances of
principal-agent theory being used as a conceptual framework by administrators. In this
case, the principal agency was the lead organization, while all of its partners are
considered agents. Principal-agent theory views these collaborative relationships as
transactional, assuming that each agency is acting to maximize their self-interest. While
there was certainly more to these relationships than their transactional value, many agents
reported the biggest benefit being the cost savings provided by their affiliation with the
principal agency. At the same time, the principal agency is concerned with the cost
efficiency of the agents as well; they want to know that their dollars are well spent. A
principal administrator shared, “We want to see who’s really moving the needle on
(providing healthy foods) and how we can help them move it even further.”
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The principal agency uses incentives and penalties to motivate agents to maintain
this desired productivity. Several agents shared that complying with the principal’s
oversight and regulations was imperative to maintaining their relationship with the
principal; in turn, many agents felt that they would be unable to carry out their operations
without assistance from the principal. In this way, the prolonged relationship between the
principal and agent served as an incentive intrinsically. One administrator shared her fear
of failing a routine check-up: “I don't want to lose the pantry you know, so I try to do
exactly what I'm supposed to do. I fret and everything before they come and think ‘Oh
God, is everything how it's supposed to be?’” While these incentives work to retain the
principal’s agents, they also help to procure new agents as well. For example, one
administrator shared, “We almost had to become a partner of the (principal agency) to
continue the work we had been doing.” Before partnering with the principal agency, this
agent had been receiving discounted food from local grocery stores. However, by
partnering with the principal agency, they were able to receive more food at a cheaper
cost. This is an example of how two organizations may enter into a contract relationship
to maximize their self-interest; the agent was able to save money and improve
productivity, while the principal agency was able to extend the reach of their network.
The most obvious component of principal-agent theory present in my
observations was the initial disposition to distrust. While feelings of trust may have
developed over time, many agent administrators communicated a tendency to distrust
new partners when beginning a new collaborative relationship. This is visible in the way
the principal agency undergoes regulatory check ins:
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When we first started, (the principal agency) checked on us pretty
regularly to make sure we had everything and understood what was going
on and that we were making good use of what they had for us. We got our
feet wet, figured out what we were doing, and they kind of backed off and
gave us a number and said call us if you need us.
This was common among many of the agents I interviewed. While the partnership
eventually turned to a more trusting, relaxed relationship, initially, the principal
agency maintained a close eye on the partner agency to ensure that it was acting
in line with the network’s shared mission and values, not for the agent’s selfinterest alone. Once an agent has proved itself trustworthy, then it receives greater
autonomy. However, this is not the principal’s initial disposition. As one
administrator shared, “Trusting comes from me asking ‘What do I know about
this place?’” In essence, reputation and history determine the administrator’s
willingness to trust.
Stewardship Theory
The results of my analyses overwhelmingly point towards the tenets of
stewardship theory. In this network arrangement, principal organizations entrust steward
organizations with carrying out the mission of the principal organization. The agencies
within this network very naturally maintain goal alignment; almost every administrator I
interviewed mentioned that it was a shared mission and commitment to clients that made
their collaborative relationships work. In fact, according to an administrator at the
principal agency, goal alignment serves as a main criterion when deciding who they will
bring on as partners:
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Our mission is to lead a network to relieve hunger and promote nutrition.
If their mission aligns with the hunger relief part of that, that's absolutely a
consideration. And it has to be something ongoing; it can't be ‘We want to
give them a holiday basket’ because hunger is a real issue 24 hours a day,
7 days a week. So our agencies that we partner with are people who are
really addressing hunger year round.
Once these organizations have been established as those who are truly addressing
hunger year round, the principal agency is able to trust these steward agencies to
carry out independent projects with greater autonomy. For example, a few
organizations were chosen to pilot different programs for the principal agent. One
organization is currently piloting an onsite food pantry specifically for the elderly
population. Throughout this process, both the principal and steward
administrators report that the steward agency was given a large amount of
discretion in deciding the structure and programming of this facility. The steward
administrator reported that the principal agency provided “freedom to meet the
unique needs of (the steward agency’s) population.”
Furthermore, I found that the principal agency of this network takes a
more involvement-oriented approach to management, as opposed to the controloriented approach associated with agency theory. This approach is categorized by
low barriers between organizations and the free exchange of information, which
was reported by both the principal and stewards within this network. On behalf of
the steward organizations, one administrator shared their experience problem
solving with the principal organization:
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We're always having to talk about the damn paperwork, which is
not the funnest thing we do. But they've always been quick to say,
‘Aw man, we screwed up' or ‘Aw man, you screwed up.’ We hate
dealing with this stuff, let's just fix it and move on. I feel like we're
on the same page... Both agencies are very nimble at what we do,
we try to be low barrier, and we enjoy problem solving, so you
won't see either agency say, ‘No, this is too hard'. We like the
challenge, and we like each other.
This instance demonstrates a low-barrier, involvement-oriented approach to
management. Rather than delegating tasks from the top-down, the principal
agency is involved in problem solving with the steward agency and admits fault
when necessary; this relationship become more of a “meeting of the minds” than
one agency passing down directives to the other. Another steward agency referred
to the principal agency as “the bridge between us and the market,” demonstrating
the work that the principal agency does on the front end to set up their partners for
success. For example, the principal agency has demonstrated this by arranging
food drives for its partner agencies, connecting partner agencies to corporate
sponsors, and developing programs for partner agencies to pilot.
At the same time, the principal agency demonstrates a desire to interact
with their partner agencies in this way. An administrator at the principal agency
shared:
We could have a transactional relationship with our partners, but
we really feel like to provide them the best customer service and to
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be able to take away barriers, we have to know them and know
what their challenges are.
This explicitly shows the principal’s desire to move beyond a “transactional
relationship”; in this network, both the principal and steward agencies strive to
work together in an honest, collaborative manner, valuing the unique
contributions each organization may bring to the table.
Furthermore, in line with the relational reciprocity tenet of stewardship
theory, organizations within this network consider the greater good of the network
and the wellbeing of their partner agencies rather than holding their self interest in
highest regard. This was apparent in actions as simple as trading food products
between organizations; one administrator reported switching larger cans of food
for smaller cans because it benefitted another agency more than it did their own.
The same kind of sharing exists regarding processes and procedures;
administrators reported learning from each other’s experiences at learning
luncheons hosted by the principal agency.
The best example of relational reciprocity was an instance shared by an
administrator at the principal agency. The principal agency had just begun
working with a new partner who also happened to operate a thrift store.
Unfortunately, a few months in, the principal agency discovered that this partner
agency was selling the discounted food they received in their thrift store. When I
asked how they knew about this, the administrator shared that it was other partner
organizations in the area that blew the whistle. While the steward agencies expect
the principal agency to provide benefits they could not otherwise attain on their
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own, these organizations are also quick to act on behalf of the principal agency;
there’s a give and take relationship at work.
Discussion
Having performed three separate data analyses through the different lenses of the
tacit theories of the administrators, principal-agent theory, and stewardship theory, I am
now able to compare these three separate findings to draw even further conclusions
regarding the management theories used within this network. Each data analysis I
performed produced different, yet meaningful conclusions. While the majority of the tacit
theories expressed by network administrators aligned with stewardship theory, there were
also elements of principal-agent theory present that cannot be dismissed.
Initially, the partners joined with the lead organization for reasons of cost and
expertise. For the most part, the partners shared that they were driven to collaborate by
the promise of discounted goods and experiential wisdom from the lead organization,
while the lead organization was able to decrease their processing costs by delegating the
delivery of goods to the partner agencies. Also, these partner agencies are more
acquainted with their service area, providing invaluable expertise and relationships that
may take years to establish. Rather than competing for these resources, these agencies
chose to collaborate. In this way, this desire for increased professionalism that I
discovered in the administrators’ tacit theories demonstrated elements of principal-agent
theory; in principal-agent theory, agencies are led to collaborate for reasons of cost and
expertise (Van Slyke, 2006).
Furthermore, we cannot ignore that the agencies within this network begin with
an initial disposition to distrust. Eventually, these agencies begin to trust one another, but
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this is a knowledge-based trust--built on the history between agencies. This was present
in the tendency for the lead organization to maintain regular, thorough check-ins with
newer organizations and then lessen the frequency and rigidity of these check-ins as the
partner organizations proved themselves trustworthy.
However, the economic benefits offered were only a small piece in
administrators’ decisions to collaborate; for the most part, it was the shared mission that
brought these organizations together. In fact, some partnerships demonstrated that the
lead organization was not concerned with its ability to gain from the partnership, but with
the opportunity to assist a smaller organization in reaching its shared mission and values.
In this way, the emphasis on informal relationships and adaptability communicated by
administrators is completely aligned with the tenets of stewardship theory.
As communicated by administrators, informal relationships were marked by a
cooperative, people-centered approach to the task at hand. A history of this kind of
relationship necessarily produced the kind of knowledge-based trust I have found to be
present in this network. In essence, informal relationships gave way to trustworthy,
professional relationships. Furthermore, there is a stark similarity between the presence
of informal relationships and the involvement-oriented management present in principalsteward relationships. Both of these elements imply a relationship that moves past the
formal working arrangement. In involvement-oriented management, the principal agency
moves past merely delegating tasks to involving its stewards in both its formation and
implementation processes. They do this by cooperating with one another, working
together while still recognizing the autonomy of each organization. Alternatively, if this
were a principal-agent relationship, the principal would pass down commands to its
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agents with no regards to the agents’ ideas or input. However, that is not the case in this
network.
Additionally, the concept of adaptability communicated by administrators
mirrored the stewardship theory tenets of relational reciprocity and a mutual adherence to
goals and values. Administrators demonstrated relational reciprocity by valuing the
wellbeing of the network above their own self-interest. In order to maintain this
reciprocity, both administrators from the lead and partner organizations shared a
“whatever-it-takes” attitude to meeting the needs of the network. This same flexible
attitude was expressed through a willingness to bend and stretch to meet the goals and
values shared by these organizations. Because these administrators have an
organizational approach rather than a self-interested mindset, they are willing to adapt in
order to further the work of their network.
Conclusion
Therefore, it seems that within this network, the lead-partner relationship begins
as a principal-agent relationship and transforms over time into a steward-agent
relationship. This process is facilitated by trust, informal relationships, and a willingness
to adapt in order to reach a shared mission and values. These findings are in line with
those of Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers (2012). Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois,
& Jegers (2012) argue that in order for principal-agent theory to be applied to the
nonprofit sector, it must be complemented by other theories of management, including
stewardship theory. They concluded that stewardship theory can be used to better explain
situations in which agents share the same interests as the principal and are motivated to
act in the best interest of the principal (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012).
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My findings agree with this conclusion; while relationships within the network
may begin as principal-agent relationships, these are quickly transformed into stewardagent relationships by the agent’s devotion to similar values and motivation to act in the
best interest of the principal. The tacit theories I have discovered within this network help
to explain this dynamic relationship between the lead and partner organizations. They
demonstrate that while lead-partner relationships in the nonprofit sector lean towards
stewardship theory because of its dedication to shared values, elements of principal-agent
theory can still be found within working relationships in this sector. Further research
could be conducted within this network in a panel study to evaluate more closely how
these individual relationships change over time in response to prolonged partnership and
organizational changes. Overall, I have found that these tacit theories, the theories use in
practice by nonprofit administrators, are much more complex than the existing
management theories used to explain interorganizational collaborations.
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Appendix
Before starting interview:
1. Introductions
2. SAY: The purpose of this study is to describe nonprofit administrators’ attitudes
toward and lessons learned about nonprofit collaborations. It is hoped that the
findings of this study will lead to more effective nonprofit collaborations and
better understanding of the elements which make these relationships thrive.
(reaffirm agreement to participate)
3. Invite participant to “anonymize” names of other people and organizations during
the interview
4. Ask whether or not the interview may be recorded
Interview:
1. Tell me about your position here, what you do, what your organization does?
2. How often do you interact with the (lead or partner)?
3. Can you explain your organization’s relationship with the (lead or partner)?
4. Can you explain a specific time when your arrangement with the (lead or partner)
was successful? (Unsuccessful?)
a. What role did your organization play?
b. Were goals clear and agreed upon between both organizations?
c. What do you mean by “success”?
d. What do you think were the most important factors contributing to the
success (failure)?
5. How do your organization’s goals align with those of the lead/partner?
a. What are the benefits of collaborating with the (lead or partner)? Probe:
gain credibility, grow reputation…
b. Are there any drawbacks? Probe: feeling freedom v. strict oversight
6. Explain the measures taken by (lead or partner) to monitor (lead or partner)?
a. Are there formal reporting mechanisms in place?
b. Do informal relationships advance transparency and accountability
between organizations?
c. Does/do (your organization/agent organizations) play a role in developing
organizational goals?
d. Is this oversight helpful in achieving organizational goals or does it harm
decision making processes for the agent organization?
7. What, if anything, has strengthened (or weakened) your connection with the (lead
or partner)?
a. Probe: trust, relationships, reputation, monitoring/oversight
8. Do you have anything else you would like to share?

